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a bstr act  Prominent positions in the contemporary theoretical field of the 
humanities tend to conceptualize late modern communities in general as aes­
thetic communities of taste. In regard to political communities, this means 
reducing the political to an implication of the aesthetic discourse. This article 
argues for addressing the aesthetic and the political as distinct discourses 
that are, on the other hand, always engaged with each other in a conflictual 
interplay. Both discourses draw on and appeal to the ability of judgement, but 
according to their own distinct principles, and depending on their respective 
weight in the conflictual interplay, this entails quite different perspectives 
with regards to political practice and community formation.
k ey wor ds  Differentiation of discourses, late modern community forma­
tion, aesthetic discourse and political community, aesthetic and teleological 
judgement.
The status of aesthetic discourse
As an implication of late modernity’s posttraditional condition, the issue 
of community formation has become increasingly vital and consequently 
holds a central position in contemporary debates on society and culture.1 
One prominent current in the debate is communitarianism which unites 
a variety of arguments in the basic assumption that the late modern con-
dition calls for moral communities of value – predominantly conceptual-
ized in a more or less restorative or essentialist manner.2
However, the discussion in this article is concerned with another main 
position in the debate, namely a widespread tendency towards conceptu-
alizing late modern community formation as a matter of taste. In other 
words, this position regards social practice in general under the auspices 
of the aesthetic discourse – not in the sense of art, but broadly under-
stood as a sensuously and emotionally based principle for acting and 
creating meaning.
Thus, in the work of Pierre Bourdieu (to whom we shall return in greater 
detail in the following) habitually rooted preferences of taste orchestrate 
the positioning of the individual in social space and determine his/her ori-
entation towards specific types of community.3 In Gerhard Schulze’s anal-
ysis of the “experience society” the aesthetic orientation of taste has, due 
to the increasing level of general wealth, advanced to an overall societal 
condition which implies that a “psycho-physical semantics” and the associ-
ated search of the individuals towards “positively charged psycho-physical 
conditions” have become dominant in the collective space of meaning. 
Communities accordingly take the shape of taste-based lifestyle groups.4 
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Michel Maffesoli’s analysis of the late modern community formation as a 
new, aestheticized version of the tribal society is likewise an exponent of 
the tendency towards generalizing taste and thus the aesthetic discourse as 
the universal principle of social practice and meaning formation.5 Further-
more, contemporary applications of this type of theory in lifestyle analy-
sis and marketing strategies have the identification and the co-creation of 
communities of taste as their main focus.
The intention of this article is not to question the general thesis that 
the aesthetic discourse plays a large – and increasing – role in late moder-
nity, but merely to challenge these tendencies towards totalizing taste and 
thereby the aesthetic discourse as the common denominator of contem-
porary communities by definition. With the aim of conceptualizing the 
specific features of political community formation, the article suggests a 
more differentiated and dynamic frame of reflection which elaborates on 
inspirations from sociological theory, not least from the tradition of criti-
cal theory and especially Jürgen Habermas’ theory of modernity.6
As is the case for modernity in general, late modernity can advanta-
geously be regarded as a societal formation that is not reducible to one 
totalizing principle. On the contrary, late modernity remains differenti-
ated into a plurality of separate discourses and discursive domains that 
are working and generating meaning each on their own specific terms. 
Thus, in his sociological interpretation of Kant’s philosophical thesis on 
the differentiation of reason (into understanding, practical reason and 
judgement), Habermas distinguishes between a cognitive-instrumental, 
a moral-practical and an aesthetic-expressive discourse (in Habermas’ 
terminology “rationality of action”) and corresponding discursive do-
mains of practice dominated by the discourse in question.
Habermas’ own work does not offer an elaborated account of the rela-
tionship between the aesthetic and the political, but primarily stresses 
the discursive differentiation and points out problematic implications in 
tendencies towards dedifferentiation such as the seductive reduction of 
political opinion formation to a matter of aesthetic fascination or the 
dogmatic reduction of aesthetic expression to political propaganda.
However, differentiation does not entail the elimination of interaction 
between discursive fields. As separate entities they are continuously in-
volved in reciprocal interplay and interventions of a more or less con-
flictual nature in which hegemonic issues may occur. In other words, 
rather than being regarded as reducible to one discursive principle, the col-
lective formation of meaning should at any time be analyzed as a specific 
and changeable relation of dominance between a plurality of discourses 
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which process a broad and heterogenous spectrum of social structures 
and types of experience. Depending on which discursive constellations 
are prevalent at a given time, we may be dealing with quite different types 
of meaning formation with correspondingly different perspectives for the 
development of communities and of society and culture in general.
Following this line of thinking, late modern communities cannot a 
priori be conceptualized as communities of taste. Constellations may oc-
cur in which the aesthetic discourse is predominant in the practice of the 
community in question, but this does not necessarily imply that cogni-
tive and moral discourses are absent, and in spite of the prominent posi-
tion of the aesthetic discourse in late modernity in general, it cannot be 
taken for granted that all late modern communities primarily generate 
meaning on the basis of a common taste.
Aesthetic discourse and political community
In the following the potentials and limitations of the aesthetic discourse 
in respect to the formation of political communities will be discussed. It 
will be a basic assumption that a political community will always be based 
on a social interest and a common will to optimize the position of this 
interest in societal practice at large. The thesis is further, that in a modern 
democracy, competent and sustainable political communities must be able 
to reflect beyond their own narrow horizon and attend to their interests in 
obligation to the common good as a discursive frame and correspondingly 
handle conflicts of interests in peaceful, dialogical forms.7
If an aesthetic discursive intervention into the community formation 
contributes to enhancing the ability of the community to attend to its 
interests on these terms, we are dealing with a constructive discursive 
balance which strengthens and qualifies the political community. If, on 
the contrary, the intervention is of a nature that deprives the community 
of the means to develop its ability to reflect its interests dialogically and 
in obligation to the common good, we are dealing with a depoliticizing 
dequalification of the community in question. We may in this connec-
tion benefit from the aesthetics of Kant in distinguishing between three 
different categories of aesthetic discursive practice:8
Firstly, the monologic, hedonistic pleasure of satisfying immediate, 
sensuous inclinations and desires – individually or in communities, but 
always within a private, self-centered horizon. Kant characterizes this 
type of discursive practice as orientated towards “the agreeable” and as 
limited to the horizon of private interest and the immediate emotions 
and desires it satisfies.
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This type of aesthetic discursive practice is an essential – though not 
all-encompassing – element in the heterogeneous tendency towards the 
aestheticization of the political in late modernity. It is for instance sig-
nificant for political agents’ marketing of themselves with the political 
substance fading away behind spectacular staging and seductive forms 
appealing targeted and exclusively to senses and emotions. The ambition 
of this type of practice is merely to be agreeable, and due to its suspen-
sion of critical reflection it bears a danger of the political process degen-
erating to demagogic manipulation.
It further mobilizes special interests by confirming the immediate, 
private preferences of taste and aesthetic fascinations of the public and 
channelling them into the formation of political sym- and antipathies 
and thereby into the development of the imagination of belonging to 
particular political communities. In the perspective of this article, this 
type of discursive practice represents an aesthetic dequalification of the 
political community in so far as the private, monological interest is not 
being challenged towards self-reflexivity, nor is it brought into reflective 
exchange with the discursive frame of the common good.
Secondly, the discursive practice which Kant calls the “judgement of 
taste”. Kant distinguishes between the private judgement and the aes-
thetic judgement. The private judgement is of an idiosyncratic nature, 
based as it is on the private sensuous preference of taste. The aesthetic 
judgement of taste, on the contrary, involves a universalizing, reflective 
mediation between sensuous perception and concept. Kant’s theory of 
the judgement of taste deals with the latter.
The judgement of taste refers to an aesthetic delight that is character-
ized by “disinterested pleasure” in that the judgement is raised above pri-
vate interests and desires and paves the way for a contemplating, qualita-
tively estimating pleasure with regard to beautiful forms – also entitled 
“the aesthetics of the beautiful”. Even though it is based on the subjective 
feeling of pleasure or displeasure, the judgement of taste is by way of its 
disinterested nature characterized by an element of reflective distance 
to its object. The judgement of taste further claims universal validity in 
that it is proposed as a dialogical offer to the general public – as a sugges-
tion as to how everybody might suitably estimate the forms of the given 
object. The judgement of taste operates on the basis of the assumption of 
an a priori sensus communis which makes it possible to communicate the 
disinterested feeling of pleasure or displeasure without using concepts. 
The notion of sensus communis, to which the judgement of taste refers, 
can further be understood as a community-orientated ability to perform 
Aesthetic Judgement and Political Judgement
11
aesthetic estimation, a societalized sense of form, structure, composition 
etc. Thus, the aesthetic formation of experience to which the judgement 
of taste gives rise, works within the familiar and well-ordered horizon of 
established form-tradition.
Furthermore, the beautiful is in the philosophy of Kant a symbol of 
the good, in as far as the aesthetics of the beautiful implies a certain 
degree of cultivation and Bildung in order to transcend the merely sensu-
ous desire and associated special interests, and in as far as the judgement 
of taste in its reference to the notion of sensus communis unfolds within 
a universal idea of morality.9 In other words, Kant installs an affinity 
between on the one hand the form-estimating aesthetic judgement and 
its sensus communis, and on the other hand an ethical judgement and an 
associated ethical sensus communis.
Consequently, the judgement of taste bears essential, constructive po-
tentials for the formation and qualification of political communities due 
to its discursive emancipation from the narrow horizon of special inter-
ests, its dialogical, public nature, its foundation in the notion of an aes-
thetic sensus communis and its possible exchange relation to an ethical 
sensus communis. Yet, in itself it seems to be an insufficient basis for the 
creation and development of competent and sustainable political com-
munities. Partly due to its restriction to a non-conceptual, feeling-based 
estimation of forms, partly due to its emphasized disinterestedness and 
the associated lack of capacity to reflect conflicts of interests as a funda-
mental feature of society as an overall political community.
In this sense, Pierre Bourdieu has a point in his critical discussion of 
Kant’s definition of the judgement of taste as “disinterested” and sen-
sus communis as a universal consensual frame.10 It seems fair to say 
that this definition in historical practice has tended to generalize the 
elite’s particular, refined orientation of taste as the universally valid and 
solely legitimate one – and correspondingly to marginalize more “popu-
lar” orientations of taste as illegitimate and vulgar. On this background, 
Bourdieu emphasizes that an aspect of interest is always inherent in the 
judgement of taste. However, Bourdieu’s analysis totalizes this point of 
permanent power struggle and thereby neglects the rational core of the 
concept of the judgement of taste and sensus communis: namely that the 
social reality of ongoing power struggle is interwoven with the emerging 
of common societal concerns and an experience-based political culture 
that transcends the horizon of special interests. In this respect, modern 
democracies, conflictual as they may be, have developed universal forms 
of reflection which in principle offer the possibility of establishing a com-
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munity of citizens that reasons in obligation to the discursive frame of 
the common good.11
In other words, whereas Kant’s theory on the judgement of taste can 
be criticized for unjustifiably universalizing a specific orientation of 
taste, Bourdieu’s critique of Kant marginalizes the perspective of univer-
sality as such and thereby the associated potentials for the development 
of democracy. This limitation thus implies that Bourdieu’s analysis of the 
political process remains fixated to the horizon of agents struggling for 
special interests, whereas the universally reflecting horizon of citizens 
is non-existing – or rather: it is by definition regarded as a blind for the 
power strategies of the upper class.
Correspondingly, Bourdieu does not address politics as a duality of 
struggle of interests and reflective regulation of common societal con-
cerns, but instead as a “field of consumption” in which each agent acts, 
orientates and positions him-/herself in the power struggle on the basis 
of his/her “political taste”. This taste is understood as rooted in the life-
long, class-specific formation of embodied sensory, emotional, moral and 
cognitive dispositions which Bourdieu conceptualizes as “habitus”. As 
the pivotal point of the practice of the individual this habitually shaped 
taste further contributes to reproducing the very symbolic distinction 
and social division of class from which it originates.
To be sure, this article agrees that different social backgrounds equip 
the individuals with quite diverse resources, e.g. in terms of qualifications 
for engaging in universal public discourse. But instead of Bourdieu’s de-
terministic conceptualization of this basic fact in the term of habitus, the 
suggestion here is to regard these background resources as elements of a 
dynamic, ongoing process of experience in which learning processes and 
self-transcending political formation, i.e. Bildung, are possible perspec-
tives.12 This processual perspective further points beyond Bourdieu’s con-
cept of taste, which remains confined to the horizon of the aesthetics of 
the agreeable and the idiosyncracy of the private judgement. Hereby the 
field is opened for transversal public dialogue on both taste and politics 
– and for realizing that although taste in the restricted sense of Bourdieu 
often appears to be a factor in political processes, politics as such cannot 
reasonably be reduced to the conduct of taste, just as political communi-
ties cannot be understood satisfactorily as mere communities of taste.
Thirdly, the type of aesthetic discourse which Kant refers to as the “aes-
thetics of the sublime”. In Kant, the sublime feeling arises in the confron-
tation with the superior forces of nature, but in the present context it is 
interpreted as a socio-cultural phenomenon. Here we are dealing with an 
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aesthetic experience which “pleases immediately by reason of its opposi-
tion to the interest of sense”.13 The delight of the sublime feeling is, in other 
words, highly ambivalent, a joy mixed with terror, the intensity of which 
is so overwhelming that it momentarily suspends the experiential and 
communicative horizon of normality and manifests itself as an “isolated 
moment of ruthless and contextless attention”, as Martin Seel has put it.14
The sublime feeling, thus, has an emphatic character of exception, it 
emerges in the individual experience of rupture and loss of control, and 
it can therefore hardly be conceived as an edifying ressource for the for-
mation of politico-cultural communities. But in the individual’s accom-
panying discursive restoration work in the shape of the reason-based 
processing of the experience of sublimity, the displacements of patterns 
of experience and reflection which it has caused, may encourage pro-
cesses of Bildung that may also have implications for the understanding 
of political communities in terms of e.g. expanding the reflective horizon 
of the participants and relativizing self-interest.
Furthermore, in processes of social revolution a periodic presence of 
sublime feelings may occur in the formation of political community. 
In such cases we are dealing with a state of collective ecstasy which is 
nourished by the rapid flux of events and the all-encompassing and fun-
damentally incalculable character of the revolutionary changes. This 
type of aesthetic discourse, however, is both chaotic and transient and 
therefore not an adequate basis for the formation of sustainable politico-
cultural communities. According to historical experience, the sublime 
feeling will be superseded by the more pragmatic and prosaic discourses 
of power- and interest struggles, as the revolutionary process develops 
into more lucid and institutionalized forms. If we, on the contrary, imag-
ine the politicized discourse of the sublime perpetuated, it would lead to 
totalitarian consequences in the shape of collectivistic pressure towards 
unity and identification resulting in denial of conflicts and difference.15
This understanding of the aesthetic dimension of revolutionary pro-
cesses bears some resemblance to Jacques Rancière’s notion of the both 
politically and aesthetically breaking “event” in which society’s estab-
lished, unequal and basically unjust system of distribution of the sen-
sible, “police”, is interrupted by “the political”, i.e. the intervention of the 
voices of the marginalized, thus making their arguments and demands 
tangible and audible and alternatives to the social order of “police” vis-
ible.16 By way of its aesthetic/performative dimension, the event accentu-
ates the radically egalitarian nature of the political and thereby chal-
lenges not only the established distribution of resources, but society’s 
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whole organization of the common, including which perceptions, articu-
lations and visions are valid and legitimate.
However, Rancière’s analysis appears to be devoid of any concrete, ex-
periential perspective of process. Struggles of interests and the associated 
processes of experience of the involved agents do not count as genuinely 
political, since they by definition refer to discourses based on inequality. 
The “event”, on the other hand, seems to be of an almost mythical nature: 
an apparently privileged, uninfected representative of a superior common 
good, i.e. the marginalized, somehow breaks through the aesthetic and po-
litical order of “police” and paves the way for a true and altogether different 
society based on equality. Questions of judgement, aesthetic experience, as-
sociated learning processes of individual agents and concrete potentials for 
political community formation have no place in this abstract dichotomy.
Political judgement as a composed entity
It appears to be an uncontroversial assumption that a well-functioning 
democratic political community presupposes empowered citizens whose 
political judgement is qualified. However, as we have seen, the mentioned 
types of aesthetic discursive practice only to a limited extent equip the 
individual with this quality of judgement. But the aesthetic discourse does 
not hold a monopoly on constituting judgement. If we conceive of judge-
ment in the sense of the broad tradition from Aristotle’s concept phronesis 
via Kant’s Critique of Judgement to Hannah Arendt’s17 and recently Oskar 
Negt’s18 and Christoph Menke’s19 interpretations of the concept, it becomes 
evident that judgement is not limited to aesthetic practice, but must be 
conceptualized as an integral part of the faculty of knowledge in general. It 
is further developed and cultivated in specific forms depending on the in-
dividual’s practical life experience and the associated formative processes.
Judgement basically performs the mediation between the specific and 
the universal, between sensory object and theoretical understanding. But 
it differs from the logical-conceptual rationality of understanding and 
reason by drawing on imagination, intuition and emotions in its mediat-
ing activity. In this sense judgement is an ability that cannot be formal-
ized and reduced to general cognitive laws, but in concrete practice it nev-
ertheless plays a central role in the establishment of general orientation. 
Judgement enables the individual to estimate whether a phenomenon is 
covered by an existing universal concept or not, and it equips the indi-
vidual with an intuitive feeling of what is the general aspect of concrete 
situations and what is therefore suitable and relevant.
Kant further distinguishes between two modalities in the work of 
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judgement: the determinative mode in which the movement of mediation 
takes its point of departure on the general level and subsumes the spe-
cific under an existing universal concept; and the reflective mode which 
departs from the specific and grants its unique qualities precedence over 
existing universal concepts. Therefore, the reflective judgement unfolds 
as an unceasing movement of investigation between an object that can-
not be fully determined and a universal concept that cannot be found.20
The aesthetic judgement, as represented by the judgement of taste, oper-
ates in the reflective mode and establishes orientation on the basis of a dis-
interested and non-conceptual, subjective feeling of pleasure or displeas-
ure in regard to forms – with a universalizing reference to the aesthetic 
sensus communis.21 Its investigative function may, by the mediating work 
of imagination, be brought into interaction with theoretical understanding 
as well as reason and the ethical sensus communis, but this interaction is 
not established automatically and may thus as well not materialize.
The judgement that unfolds in political practice in general, including 
the public debate, in democratic late modern societies should be regarded 
as a composed entity. Like the aesthetic judgement, it operates in the 
reflective mode in its investigation of a plurality of possible mediations 
between on the one hand a concrete political case or a special interest 
and on the other hand the consideration of the common good. In this 
context, the condition of practice is always complex and genuinely dif-
ficult to estimate, and logical argumentation is generally at the most able 
to establish some degree of certainty as to what is true, just and right.22
Ethical and aesthetic questions as to the personal credibility and rhetori-
cal power of persuasion of the political agents therefore often play a central 
role in the political process as guarantors of the certainty that a factually 
orientated political discourse is not fully able to provide. So, with contex-
tually shifting weight, it is fair to assume that the operative judgement of 
political practice draws on both cognitive, ethical and aesthetic discourses 
in its movement of investigation between the specific and the universal.
But if the ideal is a democratic political community based on the pub-
lic opinion formation of empowered citizens, it seems equally fair to say 
that the relevant political judgement is first of all constituted by a ratio-
nally and factually qualified ability of estimation in respect to the content 
dimension of political matters, including the reflection of both conflicts 
of interests and common concerns. In this perspective, the judgement of 
taste’s non-conceptual and disinterested communication of a subjective 
feeling of pleasure or displeasure in regard to forms, appears in itself to 
be an insufficient basis for democratic political community formation.
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To this end, we may find inspiration in the other main type of judge-
ment which Kant presents in The Critique of Judgement: the teleological 
judgement. This type of judgement also operates in the reflective mode, 
but departs from the a priori assumption of a basic purposiveness accord-
ing to which the phenomenon in question is reflectively investigated by 
means of the overall, meaning-seeking, speculative movement of reason. 
This reason-based activity of the imagination is further engaged in a 
close relationship of exchange with the ethical sensus communis which 
we in the political context might suitably define as society’s experience-
based politico-cultural community of values which is continuously 
shaped and reshaped in the positioning struggle of special interests and 
their efforts to determine the common good.
In other words, a qualified democratic political community relies on a 
judgement which primarily performs its mediation between the specific 
and the universal in dialogue with concepts and arguments of reason 
and which is capable of reflecting conflicts of interests and of processing 
them towards the perspective of the common good. A political judge-
ment that meets the challenges of late modern social reality has, in other 
words, to be able to work on the complex terms that struggles of interests 
are a basic fact of society but also that the collective experience of the 
process of struggle at the same time continuously generates the common 
good as a discursive frame, a political sensus communis, which we as a 
societal political community obligate ourselves to reflect in legitimizing 
our actions.23
The aesthetic judgement may, due to its very way of functioning, con-
tribute to strengthening the universal perspective, the ability to estab-
lish a reflective distance to immediate, private inclinations and interests 
which is necessary for the development of a democratic community, and 
the ability to imagine alternatives to the status quo. But its own means 
of production – the non-conceptual, disinterested, feeling-based estima-
tion of forms and the fundamental rejection of reflecting the conflictual 
content dimension of social practice – makes it insufficient as the main 
principle for the formation of political communities. Instead, a reason-
based political judgement should be granted precedence.
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